



Notes from the Chair

The Forum exists as an interest group of the History of Science Society, and it is our special goal to encourage and to reward excellence in our growing, exciting field of history. We have, on a rotational basis, prizes for the best dissertation and article in the field, and, on an annual basis, the early career award, which is named for that pioneer of our field, John C. Burnham. To the right you see the headline that we have a double-winner in Sarah Igo, who swept our 2004 competition. The 2005 call for submissions appears on p. 4 and reflects last year's rewriting and, we trust, improvement of the rules. We also endorse session proposals for the History of Science Society program every year, which means that the sooner we get these proposals, the better. Last minute inspirations take a bit of a chance in meeting the HSS deadlines, over which we have absolutely no control whatsoever.

Because the Forum is an interest group, it is also an organization whose members work very hard to provide service to colleagues, whether members or friends. As Chair I would encourage the initiative of any one or any group of interested scholars to suggest ways in which we might encourage the growth of our constituencies, and the number of opportunities for excellence that we may be able to stimulate.

All of this takes effort, and money as well. Please do not forget to pay your dues, and if you can afford a contribution to the Forum, please do so as well. If there are any problems, or questions, please feel free to contact me, Ham Cravens, Department of History, 615 Ross Hall, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011-1202, hcravens@iastate.edu, or (515) 294-1156 (work).

Thanks very much for your interest in and support of the Forum for the History of the Human Sciences.

Ham Cravens

Sarah Igo Sweeps FHHS Awards

Wins Burnham Award

The human sciences promise a better understanding of human behavior, human thought, and human choice. Championing the predictive power of their objective methodologies, the practitioners of human science have offered forecasts of future developments, as well as informed analyses of past events. The winner of the 2004 FHHS/JHBS John C. Burnham Early Career Award goes to Sarah Igo of the University of Pennsylvania, on the strength of a study that addresses crucial issues in the development of an area of human science that has played an important role in American politics and culture since World War II, the public opinion poll. The Burnham Award is awarded annually to a scholar in early career whose draft article is judged best by a committee of FHHS members; *The Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* will publish the winning paper with a notice about its award, and the publisher will provide the author of the paper an honorarium of US \$500.

In "Roper, Gallup, and the 'Man in the Street': Producing the Public Through the Polls, 1936-1953," Igo has given historical perspective to a scientific activity that still demands attention and scrutiny, and now not only in North America. Igo goes beyond the observation of previous scholars, that "social and political polling ... was inextricably tied to commercial research," to provide a more intimate examination of just how this social scientific methodology operated and developed in the first three decades of its existence. Igo explains important shifts in the methodology—for example, from quota sampling to more random probability sampling—as well as the personal efforts of the Roper and Gallup interviewers, who were mostly middle-class women. The author care-

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And Dissertation Award

From a field of very impressive entries, the committee has unanimously decided that Sarah Igo is the winner of the 2004 FHHS Dissertation Award. "America Surveyed: The Making of a Social Scientific Public, 1920-1960" (Princeton, 2001) is an impressive history of social surveys, developed through a masterful examination of three exemplary instances: the Middletown study of Muncie, Indiana; the political polls created by Roper and Gallup; and Alfred Kinsey's famous studies of American sexual behavior. Igo shows that these studies fit together beautifully, offering a panoramic view of public uses of social knowledge in America and proving the significance of that knowledge in relation to a broad social and cultural history. The archival collections used by Igo included letters and clippings that allow her to make her history reciprocal. The public is not merely an object of social science here, but is also a participant (or a multitude of participants), one that helps to shape the studies, and then talks back in response to them.

We were highly impressed not only by the level of research, but also by the quality of the writing, which made the dissertation a delight to read. Would it be rash to anticipate that a movie might be made about one or another part of this work? At the very least, this work will make an excellent book, and it is highly deserving of this award.

—The 2004 FHHS Dissertation Award Committee: Hunter Crowther-Heyck (chair), Richard Keller, and Theodore Porter

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Call for Papers

Cheiron

June 23-26, 2005

The International Society for the History of Behavioral and Social Sciences
37th Annual Meeting
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, California, USA.

Papers, posters, symposia, or workshops may deal with any aspect of the history of the behavioral and social sciences or with related historiographical and methodological issues. All submissions must conform to the length limitations listed below (references, tables, etc. may be appended). To facilitate blind review, please include a cover sheet indicating: a) title; b) the author's name and affiliation; c) the author's address and phone number; and d) audio/visual needs.

Papers: Submit a completed paper (7-8 double-spaced pages plus a short abstract), or a 700-800 word abstract plus short bibliography. Papers should be original, i.e., not previously presented at other conferences.

Posters: Submit an abstract.

Symposia: Submit a 250-word abstract describing the symposium as a whole, and a 500-700 word abstract plus short bibliography from each of the participants. A cover letter should include the names and institutional affiliations of each of the participants, which should not be revealed in the abstracts.

Workshops: Contact the program co-chairs (wpickren@apa.org or alexr@yorku.ca).

Proposal deadline: **January 7th, 2005.**

Submit proposals to program co-chairs:

Alexandra Rutherford at alexr@yorku.ca or

Wade Pickren at wpickren@apa.org

Electronic submission strongly encouraged (as attachments .doc or .rtf)

Call for Papers

History of Science Society

November 3-6, 2005

The 2005 Annual Meeting, held jointly with the Society for the History of Technology, will be in Minneapolis. In order to make our presence known, FHHS members might start considering the HSS annual meeting already at this early date.

Proposal Deadline: April 1, 2005

Proposals limited to 250 words. The HSS accepts both at-large / individual papers and complete sessions. According to the HSS executive director, complete sessions have a higher rate of acceptance. Given our particular interest in Human Science, members of this Forum ought to conspire in the formation of sessions. Contact one of the officers listed on p. 2 of this Newsletter if you need assistance finding scholars with interests similar to yours.

The HSS now encourages participants to submit their proposals online through the HSS website (<http://www.hssonline.org>), although please note that this feature will not be available until January 2005. See the HSS website after January for the specifics on proposal submissions.

Call for Papers
EHHS
 September 13-18, 2005

European Society for the History of the Human Sciences
 24th Annual Conference
 Moscow

Papers: Proposals are invited for papers on the human sciences, broadly construed. Several sessions will be organized around the theme of the psychological and social sciences in Russia and in broader context.

Posters: also accepted.

Languages: In crafting your talk, please bear in mind the special challenge of communicating with Russian speakers, many of whom have some English, somewhat fewer of whom know French or German.

Proposal deadline: May 1, 2005

Submit a one-page abstract to each member of the Programme Committee:

Irina Sirotkina & Roger Smith (local organisers): rsmith@mail.ru

Christian Allesch: christian.allesch@sbg.ac.at

Thomas Sturm: sturm@bbaw.de

Contact deadline: December 2004

As soon as possible, please inform Roger Smith by e-mail or fax of your intention to attend. Include the title of your intended paper or session and the names of any persons accompanying you. Final commitments to attend must be made by May 1, 2005 to allow time for obtaining a visa (date subject to forward adjustment).

Logistics: Arrangements for the conference site and accommodations have yet to be finalized. Costs will be comparable to previous ESHHS meetings. Information about arrangements, including visas, will be circulated in due course. Travel grants and student financial support will be forthcoming, hopefully. There will be an opportunity to see central Moscow.

Suggestions and information: rsmith@mail.ru
 phone/fax: +7 095 246 66 24

News of Members

Adrian C. Brock, Johann Louw. J. and Willem van Hoorn, eds.) (2004). *Rediscovering the history of psychology: Essays inspired by the work of Kurt Danziger*. New York: Kluwer/Plenum, 2004). The contributors (in chronological order): Adrian C. Brock, Henderikus J. Stam, Johann Louw, Andrew S. Winston, Pieter J. van Strien, Richard Walsh-Bowers, Betty M. Bayer, Hans van Rappard, Willem van Hoorn, Irmingard Stauble, and Kurt Danziger.

Since turning over his editorship of the Newsletter, David Robinson has become prolific

Publications:

David K. Robinson and Robert Rieber, eds., *The Essential Vygotsky* (NY: Kluwer/Plenum Press, 2004).

David K. Robinson: "Wilhelm von Humboldt and reform of the university [in Russian]," in *Kharkiv's'kyi istoriografichnyi zbirnyk, Vypusk 7* (2004), pp. 50-58.

Presentations:

David K. Robinson, "Wilhelm von Humboldt and reform of the university [in Russian]" at a conference "Obrasy universytetiv v publistysty ta istoriografii (VIII. Astakhov'ki Chitannia)," Faculty of History Kharkiv National University, Ukraine, 25 June 2004.

David K. Robinson, "W. Wundt und seine Bedeutung für die Psychologie der Vereinigten Staaten [W. Wundt and his Importance for Psychology in the United States]," Symposium of 125 Years since the First Institute of Psychology at Leipzig University, Leipzig, Germany, 27 March 2004.

David K. Robinson, "Fulbright as a Life-changing Experience," anniversary panel of the German-American Fulbright Commission: Celebrating 50 Years of Berlin Seminar, Berlin, Germany, 23 March 2004.

Send your news and recent publications to the editor (mcarhart@odu.edu).

Burnham Citation

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fully documents how the assumptions and prejudices of the 1940s and 1950s colored the "scientific data." She also indicates essential failures of the social scientific community, who began to scrutinize the methodology only after the pollsters' miscall the 1948 presidential election threatened the reputation of their fragile new industry. Only a historian who understands the broad social and political trends in the USA, as well as statistics, social psychology, and political theory, could write such a convincing account.

The research is deep, broad, and complex. It draws on the popular press as well as technical literature and personal papers; it shows the intimate connection that polling had with commercial advertising (its

essential origin) and the democratic and scientific ideals of the founders, whose names still grace today's polls. The article is a cautionary tale about social and human sciences. It is ironic, for example, that Roper, whose background was pure business, was actually more sensitive to methodological problems and issues of minority opinion, than was the famous Dr. Gallup, with his Ph.D. in applied psychology. What seems clear is that the pollsters, with their good intentions to use science for democracy, could not divert the very strong currents taking American culture toward homogeneity and corporatism. Ultimately they could only aid in the process and help create that "man in the street."

—2004 Burnham Award Committee: Debbie Weinstein (chair), Hamilton Cravens, and David Robinson

Call for Submissions

John C. Burnham Early Career Award

F H H S / J H B S

The Forum for History of Human Science (FHHS) and the Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences (JHBS) encourage researchers early in their careers to submit unpublished manuscripts for the annual John C. Burnham Early Career Award, named in honor of this prominent historian of the human sciences and past-editor of JHBS. The journal will publish the winning paper with a notice of the award, and the publisher will provide the author of the paper an honorarium of US \$500.

Guidelines: Unpublished manuscripts dealing with any aspect(s) of the history of the human sciences are welcome. Eligible scholars are those who do not hold tenured university positions (or equivalent); graduate students and independent scholars are encouraged to submit. "Early career" is interpreted to include the period up to seven (7) years beyond the Ph.D. Since competition may be high in any given year, people are encouraged to re-submit in subsequent years, as long as the manuscript has not been already submitted to some other journal and the submitting scholar is still in early career.

The paper submitted is the most important aspect of the competition, but since this is an "early career award," the prize committee will also consider professional activities, including (though not limited to) participation in annual meetings of the History of Science Society and other

scholarly work. The submission consists of three copies of the paper and three of the candidate's c.v. The paper must meet the publishing guidelines of the JHBS; for conference papers, these guidelines generally include revision and expansion to create an article-length paper.

The committee will acknowledge receipt of each submission and will promptly confirm its eligibility. The committee's selection of the prize-winner (the nominee to JHBS editors) will be announced at the annual History of Science Society meeting (held October or November). (If there are no appropriate submissions in any given year, no award will be given for that year.)

FHHS will promptly notify JHBS of its endorsement, and the manuscript will go through the regular refereeing process of the journal. After the editors of JHBS have accepted the nominated paper for publication, it will be published on their timetable and the publisher will issue the honorarium. Although it is technically possible that someone might win the Burnham Early Career Award and not receive the honorarium, FHHS and JHBS do not expect this to happen under normal circumstances.

Deadline: April 30. Send three copies of unpublished manuscript and of c.v., to Nadine Weidman, Secretary of FHHS, 138 Woburn St., Medford MA 02155

Further information @ <http://www.fhhs.org>

Call for Submissions

2005 FHHS Article Award

Offered Biennially

The Forum for History of Human Science invites submissions for its Article Award for 2005. The competition is for glory. No money is awarded, but the winner will be presented with acclaim at the History of Science Society annual meeting in Minneapolis as well as announced to societies of similar interest including Cheiron, ESHHS, History of Anthropology Society, as well as in this Newsletter and in the Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences.

Guidelines: The competition is for published articles appearing with an imprint date of 2002-2004 inclusively. Entries are encouraged from

authors in any discipline as long as the publication is related to the history of the human sciences, broadly construed. The winner of the 2005 Article Award will be announced at the annual meeting of the Forum for History of Human Science, held in conjunction with the History of Science Society meeting, which will be held in Minneapolis, Minnesota, 3-6 November 2005.

Deadline: July 1, 2005. Send three copies of the article to Nadine Weidman, Secretary of FHHS, 138 Woburn St., Medford MA 02155

Further information @ <http://www.fhhs.org>

Advertisement

Benefit to Members

J H B S

For more than three decades, the **Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences** has served as the premier forum for the dissemination of noteworthy scholarly research related to the evolution of the behavioral and social sciences. Among the benefits of FHHS's formal affiliation with the **Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences** is the opportunity for members to subscribe to the journal at a 15% discount off the regular personal rate.

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from the History of Science Society meeting
Commentaries on Sponsored Sessions

Cambridge, Mass., November 20-23, 2003

The following are the concluding remarks to two of the four sessions sponsored by the FHHS at the History of Science Society meeting in November, 2003. The Spring 2004 issue of the Newsletter included the comments of William Woodward and Lorraine Daston. This issue includes the comments of Bruce Mazlish and John Carson.

The Organic Metaphor and the Human Sciences

Commentary by **Bruce Mazlish** (MIT) on papers read by:

Michael Carhart, "Culture and the Rejection of the Organic Metaphor in the 1780s"

Naomi Beck, "The Appeal of the Organic Metaphor in Spencerism"

Daniela Barberis, "A Novel Object for Science: 'Society' as Defined by the Organic Metaphor"

These three papers give thoughtful consideration to the use of the organic metaphor as an organizing concept. The first paper studies it in the late eighteenth century, the next two in the late nineteenth century, and their range is England, France, Germany, and Italy. They raise the question why resort is had to the metaphor, and in what ways such usage fosters the possibility of the human sciences. After a brief summary of the individual papers, I will then undertake a commentary on the subject as a whole, raising questions of my own.

Michael Carhart, "Culture and the Rejection of the Organic Metaphor in the 1780s," sees the organic metaphor as being old and the idea of culture as new. He then explores how both hold out the possibility of a science. If the state or society (and he seems to slide between the two terms) is organic and natural, then it should be reducible to natural laws. These laws seem to entail that all states will decline. Decadence, often marked by an excess of luxury, appears inevitable. Culture, on the other hand, is presumably shaped by humans—we become human by education, says Herder, for example—and can in principle be reshaped. Thus, while the organic entails death and destruction, the idea of culture makes possible, at least in theory, the fulfillment of something like an "Enlightenment Project."

If Carhart seems to have sounded the death knell of the organic metaphor as a useful pointer to human science, its resurrection is heralded by the papers of Beck and Barberis. Let me address each one separately. **Naomi Beck**, "The Appeal of the Organic Metaphor in Spencerism," starts with Herbert Spencer, who, in "The Social Organism" of 1861 and other works, appeals to evolutionary theory in order to compare the development of both organic entities and of societies. His aim is to establish the possibility, as Beck tells us, "of a truly scientific science of society and, with it, truly rational politics." One happy result for Spencer is a justification of his laissez-faire and individualist credo. In the rest of her paper, however, Beck shows that an opposite conclusion can result from the use of the organic metaphor. For example, Alfred

Espinas ends up emphasizing mutual aid and a doctrine of "Solidarisme." So, too, does Leon Bourgeois, an important official in the Third Republic. An Italian counterpart was Enrico Ferri. Their embrace of the organic metaphor had two interesting outcomes, one offering a rationale of the welfare state and the other stressing that, as a living organism, society cannot undergo drastic and swift changes such as to be found in revolution.

Daniela Barberis, "A Novel Object for Science: 'Society' as Defined by the Organic Metaphor," agrees that the notion of society as an organism could lead to either liberal or authoritarian conclusions. Her main concern, however, is with the implications of the metaphor for a science of society. It is her view that, even after the metaphor came to be rejected, the concept of society employed by later sociology nevertheless retained organicist traits fundamental to the establishment of a better understanding of human relations. Treating four individuals as proponents of organicism—Alfred Espinas, Rene Worms, Paul von Lilienfeld, and Jacques Novicow—Barberis seeks to show how they viewed society as a natural product, developing by virtue of an inner necessity. Without arguing the merits of the organic metaphor, Barberis stresses how it gave support to the belief that social laws must exist, thus laying the basis for a triumphant positivism and for the future work of Emile Durkheim. (As an incidental insight, Barberis confided to me afterwards, on my mentioning the seventeenth-century origins of the concept of "society," that it did not include all members of society, for it was seen as estate and class based, whereas the organic metaphor was all-inclusive.)

There are two ways in which comments on these interesting papers can be organized. One is to treat them mainly as historical monographic accounts, and critique them in these terms. The other is to focus on them as pointing to a science of society. While the two ways overlap, my emphasis will be on the second approach.

Two names must hover over this second road. The first is Auguste Comte, the putative father of sociology, who coined this term for the science of man that would come after biology, and would go through the same stages as the previous sciences, arriving finally at positivism. Although starting from biology, Comte does not think in terms of the organic metaphor, but is concerned with social statics and social dynamics. The second name hovering is Charles Darwin. While evolutionary theory serves as the backdrop for most of the nineteenth-century thinkers invoked in the papers of Beck and Barberis, the organic metaphor is absent from the great biologist's mind. When he came to write *The Descent of Man*, he was concerned with *cultural* evolution.

So much for the large shadows that must necessarily loom behind our subject. A more immediate presence is Emile Durkheim. Though more or less in the positivist camp, and partial to the organic metaphor, or so we are told, he actually confuses the issue to a certain extent. By using the term "organic" to describe the division-of-labor type of society, thus rejecting Tonnies' use of that term for the *Gemeinschaft* type, and reserv-

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ing “mechanical” for it, the great French sociologist reverses the valences involved. A spanner has, so to speak, been thrown in the works.

Such usage can return us to the origins of the concept of society, in the seventeenth century. Western men (and some women) at the time began to see their form of social intercourse—society—no longer as coming from the hand of God but rather as a fabrication of their own hands. Increasingly, society is seen as a “machine,” not an organism. As such it is subject to human intervention and invention. We are on our way to social revolutions. In contrast, the revived organic metaphor can substitute for God, as being beyond human decisions. A la Burke, the upheavals of the French Revolution are therefore unnatural. Subsequent debates often take place as a struggle over the mechanical or organic nature of society.

By now we can see how the debate over culture and the organic metaphor, to which we have now added the mechanical, serves political purposes rather more than scientific ones. Though the organic metaphor, as argued, keeps alive the hope for a scientific sociology, one that can be pronounced positivist, in itself it is actually a misleading and facile analogy. The human sciences will move in other directions. The word “hermeneutics” will become central to the discourse. There is little or no room for this development in the organic metaphor.

One other side comment. When society is conceived of as a nation, or nation-state, it approximates a bounded unit, closed upon itself. In this it can be thought to resemble an organism. Opposed to this conception is that of an open society, characterized by cultural diffusion. Thus, we see again that the use of metaphors—in this case a preference for the cultural, the mechanical, or the organic—has profound, potentially political consequences. Extrapolating, we may ask: which concept should apply to our present-day globalizing society? In a computer-driven society does the organic metaphor any longer have life to it?

Now a final reflection inspired by the three papers under consideration. Having worth in their own right as historical monographs (whose authors, naturally, may feel that I have incorrectly interpreted them), they also invoke further thought as to the nature of the human sciences. In doing so, they force us to a necessary first step. It is to employ skepticism in regard to metaphors and analogies in general. While accepting the fact that they are omnipresent and essential in the ways humans think, it is critical that we also recognize that they are often misleading (cf. the first chapter of *The Railroad and the Space Program: An Exploration in Historical Analogy*, ed. B. Mazlish, MIT Press, 1965). They can become substitutes for true analysis. They may stand in the way of the human sciences forging their own inquiries, in line with appropriate scientific method, but not seeking to model themselves unthinkingly on the natural sciences.

Selves, Subjects, and Identities in the 20th-c. Human Sciences

Commentary by **John Carson** (University of Michigan) on papers by:

Elizabeth Lunbeck, “Paradoxes of Plenty: The American as Exemplary Narcissist”

Greg Eghigian, “Socialism and the Sciences of the Deviant Self: The East German Psyche Observed”

Alison Winter, “Chemistry of Truth and Sciences of Identity on Film, 1930-1950”

Sarah Igo, “Statistics, Selves, and Other Subjects: Kinsey-Era Americans”

One of the longstanding issues in the history of the human sciences has been the relationship of the pathological and the normal. As early as the 1940s, G. Canguilhem in his path-breaking work *Le normale et le pathologique* identified the complex relations between these two seemingly polar states as critical to the development of the human and life sciences. The normal and the pathological, Canguilhem argued, began as descriptors of distinct physical states, and then came to be linked together over the course of the nineteenth century, with the pathological subsumed by the normal as a consequence of reinterpreting qualitative difference as quantitative variation. Using the experimental ideals championed by Broussais, Comte, and Bernard as touchstones, Canguilhem argues that the normal came to be conceived of as a single, well-defined state, and the pathological as a multiplicity of possible distortions of that state.

This way of understanding the relations of the normal and the pathological, the deviant and the central tendency, has been enormously fruitful for understanding the development of many projects within modern human sciences, as scholars ranging from I. Hacking to T. Porter to K. Danziger have vividly shown. Nonetheless, the papers today remind us that there were alternative paths, ones which either reversed this relation of normal to pathological, or perhaps simply denied the place of the pathological *in toto*.

Elizabeth Lunbeck, “Paradoxes of Plenty: The American as Exemplary Narcissist,” gives perhaps the clearest example of the reversed relation of pathological to normal. What is visible first to psychiatrists is that there are these odd “new patients,” clearly pathological, who do not yet fit easily into existing psychoanalytic schemes. Their pathology is so great and obvious that their status as psychologically troubled cannot be dismissed, even when it is at first hard to note exactly what is wrong with them. Slowly, Liz tell us, new diagnostic categories, heterodox psychoanalytic theories, and still more inescapable examples of the “new patient” converge, and their pathology—narcissism—becomes clinically real. Only after that pathology is made real, because it is tied to extreme disorders that are visible even when psychologists cannot at first make sense of them, however, does the next transformation occur. Through the work of both psychiatrists and cultural critics, the “everyday” narcis-

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sist is discovered/invented/diagnosed; the person whose symptoms are not acute, but can be made sense of through this new category of illness, is now brought to the edge of normality. Normality, in other words, becomes if not visible, at least bounded by the move to create a narcissism of everyday life.

In **Greg Eghigian**, “**Socialism and the Sciences of the Deviant Self: The East German Psyche Observed**,” the East German government starts out somewhat wary of the human sciences and their supposed expertise, worried that these sciences are tied more to bourgeois individualism than to the production of socialist personalities. Quickly, however, the psychological sciences become highly relevant, not so much, at least initially, as guides teaching the state how to turn old fascists into new socialists, but as technologies to cope with the residue of bourgeois existence, the socially deviant. Criminals, alcoholics, capitalists, juvenile delinquents—indeed, the whole range of behaviors deemed discordant with the demands of socialist life—come to be seen as pathological, and thus in need of the explanations and ministrations of the psychological sciences. Whether or not these sciences were actually helpful in treating these various “conditions,” (and one wonders whether they were), their great power was to provide a language that could explain how these very visible individuals with their anti-socialist behaviors could exist at all in a socialist republic, why it would be right to see them as “diseased” rather than as failures of the socialist project, and how it might be possible to “cure” them and bring them back into society as a whole. From that foothold provided by the problem of pathology, Greg suggests, the human sciences came to have more and more to say in the GDR about defining what was deviant and what was normal, until the therapeutic regime had become part and parcel of the administrative state.

In **Alison Winter**, “**Chemistry of Truth and Sciences of Identity on Film, 1930-1950**,” the pathological is clearly central, though the relation to the normal, perhaps a bit different than in Liz’s account. Like Liz’s “new patients,” Alison’s war hysterics are highly visible well before they are completely understood. The detritus of war campaigns, mental casualties no longer able to act as normal soldiers should, they are easily identified and present two fundamental problems for the Army and its medical personnel. One is therapeutic: how to get them sufficiently healed, sufficiently normal in a military sense, to get them back to the frontlines, and to accomplish this as quickly as possible. The second problem is diagnostic: how to determine who is suffering from “real” pathology, and who is faking. One of the solutions to both, as Alison has shown us, was psychopharmaceuticals, deemed able to help patients integrate traumatic experiences back into their lives and thus to allow them to fight again, and at the same time to reveal, if not the truth of the trauma, the truth that there was trauma. Real pathology would react to the drugs in one way, faked in quite another. Or at least so medics were taught to believe. Here pathology is central to what the military psychological experts are up to, but the relations to the normal are pretty starkly dichotomous: one is either severely enough disabled to require treatment, or one is normal. The drugs and the training films all enforce this

dichotomy, this disinterest in even wondering, for example, why some soldiers would fake. Or what about soldiers who are suffering but have not broken down? Or even, what about outliers—real “pathologies” that do not respond as most sufferers do? In essence, the drive is to eliminate gray areas, but to do so not by making the understanding of normal sharper, but by doing precisely the opposite: by assuming that if the pathological—already so visible—can be carefully described and bounded, then the normal, at least the military normal, can be everything else. Thus, one of the problems with the John Huston movie may have been that it suggested the existence of an in-between condition that the military simply could not afford to have present in the minds of anyone.

Finally there is **Sarah Igo**, “**Statistics, Selves, and Other Subjects: Kinsey-Era Americans**,” which on the surface is the case that stands out. Her story is clearly not exactly one where the pathological makes new categories visible, or where the pathological defines the normal. But hers is anomalous too, because statistics, in her account, do not create one well-defined normality, but rather something we might call pluri-normality. The wonderful twist in Sarah’s story is that so many of the consumers of Kinsey’s statistics turn to them, not to learn what the truly normal is—that place on the distribution curve where there are the maximum number of examples—and thus whether they are deviant or not, but rather to be reassured that whatever their sexual history and sexual desires, there are many others like them. One can almost hear Sarah’s people shouting out: “Thank God I’m not alone! I’m not that different after all!” One of the striking aspects of the many volunteers wanting to share their secrets with Kinsey is that, in the anonymity of Kinsey’s statistical renderings, they found release, a way to see their individual histories become represented as just one among a number, no better or worse than anyone else’s. Rather than feel pathologized, many felt liberated, even made normal. Kinsey gave them not only a language with which to understand themselves, but also a rubric in which pathology seemed to vanish entirely.

Now clearly, this is not the typical pattern in the human sciences. As we see in the papers by Liz, Greg, and Alison, the sense of visibility attached to the pathological and the demand for therapeutic intervention that the designation “pathological” carries with it have made the pathological an extraordinarily powerful concept in these sciences, and have allowed them to make deep inroads into the everyday existence of ordinary people. Nonetheless, in Sarah’s paper we can see just how fragile the coherence of the normal can be. Without the presence of the tight limits that the pathological can place on the boundaries of the normal, it may be begin to dissipate into a sea of normalities, statistical markings of differences in categories but without the hierarchizing—the assessment of good or bad, healthy or destructive—that the normal so often carries with it. In all these papers, it seems to me, what becomes clear is how much knowledge creation in the human sciences must be seen to be the result of dynamic interchanges between experts and the subjects they study, but who do not stand still in the process.

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